In this paper we consider that a group of decision makers rank a set of alternatives by means of weak orders for making a collective decision. Since decision makers could have very different opinions and it should be important to reach a consensuated decision, we have introduced indices of contribution to consensus for each decision maker for prioritizing them in order of their contributions to consensus. These indices are defined by means of a consensus measure which assigns a number between 0 and 1 to each subset of decision makers. For putting in practice this idea, we have introduced a class of consensus measures based on distances on weak orders and we have analyzed some of their properties. We have illustrated the weighted decision procedure with an example.
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Preliminaries
Consider a set of decision makers or voters V = {v 1 , . . . , v m } (m ≥ 3) who show their preferences over a set of alternatives X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } (n ≥ 3). With L(X) we denote the set of linear orders on X, and with W (X) the set of weak orders on X. Given R ∈ W (X), the inverse of R is the weak order R −1 defined by
A profile is a vector R = (R 1 , . . . , R m ) of weak or linear orders, where R i contains the preferences of the voter v i , with i = 1, . . . , m. Given a profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R m ), we denote
If π is a permu-tation on {1, . . . , m} and ∅ = I ⊆ V , we denote R π = (R π(1) , . . . , R π(m) ) and
Given a permutation σ on {1, . . . , n}, we denote with R σ = (R σ 1 , . . . , R σ m ) the profile that results of recalling in R the alternatives according to σ, i.e.,
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. The cardinal of I is denoted by |I|. With P(V ) we denote the power set of
We now introduce a system for codifying linear and weak orders by means of vectors which represent the relative position of each alternative in the corresponding order. Similar procedures have been considered in the generalization of scoring rules from linear orders to weak orders (see Smith, 
n determines the corresponding linear order.
There does not exist a unique system for codifying weak orders. We propose one based on linearizing the weak order and to assign each alternative the average of the positions of the alternatives within the same equivalence class. As an example, consider 7 alternatives arranged in the weak order:
x 1 x 4 ∼ x 7 x 6 . Then, this weak order is codified by the vector (4, 2, 2, 5.5, 2, 7, 5.5). Taking into account this idea, given a profile of weak orders (R 1 , . . . , R m ) ∈ W (X) m , the mapping o i : X −→ {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, . . . , n − 0.5, n} assigns the relative position of each alternative in R i .
We now introduce a simple procedure for constructing a distance on W (X) from a distance on R n .
Example 1.1. Typical examples of distances in R n are the following:
For p = 1 and p = 2 we have the Manhattan and Euclidean distances, respectively.
∞ and d c are neutral for every p ≥ 1.
Consensus measures
Consensus measures have been analyzed by Bosch 4 in the context of linear orders. We now extend this concept to the framework of weak orders.
Definition 2.1. A consensus measure on W (X)
m is a mapping
that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) Weak unanimity. For every R ∈ W (X) m , M(R, V ) = 1 if and only if
(2) Anonymity. For all permutation π on {1, . . . , m}, R ∈ W (X) m and I ∈ P 2 (V ), M(R π , I π ) = M(R, I). (3) Neutrality. For all permutation σ on {1, . . . , n}, R ∈ W (X) m and I ∈ P 2 (V ), M(R σ , I) = M(R, I).
We now introduce other properties that consensus measures can satisfy.
] be a consensus measure.
(1) M satisfies strong unanimity if for all R ∈ W (X) m and I ∈ P 2 (V ), M(R, I) = 1 if and only if
Obviously, strong unanimity implies weak unanimity. 
If
Md is neutral, then we say that Md is the consensus measure associated withd. 
where
We can use the vector c(R) for prioritizing the decision makers in order of their contribution to consensus, as suggested by Cook, Kress and Seiford. 5 In this way, we introduce a new index
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. We now define a weight for each voter:
, 
Thus, we can order the alternatives through the weak order on X defined by
An illustrative example
In order to illustrate the above decision making procedure, we now consider the set of voters V = {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 } that rank order the alternativas of X = {x 1 , . . . , x 7 } by means of the following weak orders:
Taking into account the consensus measure Md for d p with p = 2, d ∞ and d c , we obtain the following coefficients: Because of each distance has a different sensitiveness towards heterogeneity, the election of the distance can be crucial for determining the outcome. This is the reason why the outcomes in the previous example have been different.
